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an initial response may be to consider their market structure as one of perfect competition. Upon fkrther
consideration, though, one sees this is inaccurate. In fact, the market structure of higher learning incorporates
elements of monopolistic competition, oligopoly, and monopoly. An institution may not explicitly be a profit
maximizer. However, treating it as such allows predictions of actions to be made by applying the above three
market structures. Such predictions include the quantity of education offered as well as advertising tendencies
(Section 11), scrutiny of competitors (Section III), and price discrimination (Section IV).
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The Market Structure of Higher Learning 
Brett Roush 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A student embarking on a college search is 
astounded at the number of higher learning 
institutions available -- an initial response may 
be to consider their market structure as one of 
perfect competition. Upon fkrther 
consideration, though, one sees this is 
inaccurate. In fact, the market structure of 
higher learning incorporates elements of 
monopolistic competition, oligopoly, and 
monopoly. An institution may not explicitly be 
a profit maximizer. However, treating it as 
such allows predictions of actions to be made 
by applying the above three market structures. 
Such predictions include the quantity of 
education offered as well as advertising 
tendencies (Section 11), scrutiny of 
competitors (Section III), and price 
discrimination (Section IV). 
IL MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 
Though thousands of firms offer their 
product - an education and degree -- each has 
unique aspects. Campus envircknent, faculty, 
academic reputation, location, and countless 
other differentiate one institution 
fiom another. However, each institution's 
product is a substitute for the others'. (Some 
are closer substitutes, of course -- Yale and 
Southwestern Kentucky Bible School are not 
equally good substitutes for Harvard). Since 
each institution has a monopoly over its own 
product and product differentiation is evident, 
higher learning can be modelled as a 
monopolistic competition market. 
The first prediction made by the 
monopolistic competition model is the 
equilibrium quantity supplied. With product 
differentiation, the individual institution's 
demand curve is downward-sloping. To 
maximize profit, an institution's offered 
enrollment will be the level at which MC = 
MR (see FIGURE 1). Though the quantity 
can be predicted, in this analysis the price is 
not yet determined. Simple mark-up pricing, 
characteristic of a monopolistic competitor, 
does not apply, as this paper will later 
demonstrate. 
FIGURE 1 : Quantity Supplied , 
Monopolistic Competition 
Q, 
Quantity 
Another important ramification of this 
model - that advertising expenditures are 
significant - relates to the higher education 
industry. Each institution has extensive 
advertising, both informational (through such 
mediums as Peterson's Guides and direct 
mailings to potential applicants) and 
glamorous (such as sports recognition and $25 
million science buildings). The institution's 
name is plastered on merchandise, alumni are 
encouraged to express pride in their alma 
mater, and the "publish or perish" doctrine at 
many research institutions means you must 
elicit recognition for your name -- and the 
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institution's name. Combined, these methods 
make advertising a central concern of each 
institution, as the monopolistic competition 
model predicts. 
Theoretically, the amount of advertising 
would be such that the marginal revenue from 
one extra advertising dollar equals that dollar; 
alternatively, the marginal revenue of the 
advertisimg dollar equals the price elasticity of 
demand. Whether an institution implements 
this efficient level is not easily discernible. 
First, many forms of advertising, such as 
constructing a flashy new building, have 
benefits other than simply increased revenue. 
Others, like merchandise bearing the 
institution's insignia, may actually have no cost 
since the advertising itself represents revenue. 
Moreover, such elements as marginal revenue 
fiom advertising expenditures and price 
. elasticities are difficult to estimate. The 
determination of an institution's efficiency in 
advertising expenditures would be an extensive 
research project. 
An important prediction of the 
monopolistic competition model that does not 
describe higher learning is that long-run 
economic profits are zero. This conclusion is 
based on the ease of entry and exit of firms, 
but higher education presents significant 
barriers, such as the necessity for a reputation 
and the large amount of capital required to 
open an institution This paper will show that, 
in fact, long-run profits are possible. 
m. OLIGOPOLY 
The previous model has another substantial 
shortcoming when applied to the industry of 
higher education - the substitutes vary widely, 
as mentioned earlier. Instead of one 
comprehensive market with some good and 
some poor substitutes, the market is 
segmented into small groups of institutions 
that are considered nearly perfect substitutes. 
Some of this segmentation is reflected in the 
sports listings: Big 10, PAC 8, Ivy League. 
These divisions are made for athletic 
competition, but what underlies them? Each 
division encompasses institutions with similar 
qualities, such as size, student characteristics, 
and location. More importantly, a consumer 
typically chooses one or two of these 
categories and then decides among the schools 
included. In a sense, a small number of f h s  
sell to a specific group of consumers in a niche 
of the higher education market. Since the 
market is plausibly divided into small units 
and, as explained earlier, there are barriers to 
entry, an oligopolistic model is appropriate. 
One of the few definite predictions the 
oligopoly model makes does pertain to higher 
learning. This market structure's theory 
contends that each institution will scrutinize 
the others' actions, and must consider 
reactions when planning their own actions. 
This most certainly occurs. W U  observes 
policies in other small liberal arts universities -- 
for example, Dr. Robert Leekley compared 
faculty salaries and benefits of area 
institutions. Also, I recall an article in my 
freshman seminar detailing the monitoring by 
top East coast universities of Duke's 
revolutionary multi-cultural programs. 
Also, collusion is possible. An example of 
formal collusion would be the small college 
consortium, where many small colleges in 
Illinois unite for employers to recruit students. 
Total benefits are increased - working 
individually, each institution would not attract 
many recruiters. Informal collusion may exist 
as well. I recall rumors of Ivy League 
admissions counsellors meeting in order to 
diwy up financial aid for students (who 
generally apply to multiple institutions in that 
oligopoly). 
The previous conclusions (under a 
monopolistic competition assumption) 
concerning advertising and product 
differentiation are not invalid with an 
oligopolistic interpretation. Mansfield (1 994) 
declares that "In many oligopolistic industries, 
firms tend to use nonprice competition, like 
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advertising and variation in product 
characteristics." This makes sense, since 
institutions initially attract students with their 
reputations and programs rather than 
competitive prices. 
R IV. MONOPOLY 
Once an institution is chosen, the market $ structure changes drastically. As mentioned g - before, an institution has a monopoly on its 
W own product. Also, once a student enters an 
institution, barriers to entry occur, diierently 
than described earlier. In this case, it is the 
consumer, the student, who finds barriers in 
attempting to bring his business to another 
firm. The rigmarole of physically transferring, 
refinancing, and acclimatizing the student and 
his past course work to a new institution all 
help prevent changing the institution providing 
the education. Thus a monopoly market 
- structure applies. 
k The most fascinating application of this 
k structure lies in pricing. In a typical 
monopoly, the profit-maximizing price would 
be at the price illustrated by the demand curve 
at the quantity offered. In this case, though, 
two interesting variations exist. First, the 
quantity was determined in the monopolistic 
competition market structure, so &intity 
supplied is less than it would be under a typical 
monopoly. Second, a conflict develops 
concerning the profit-maximization strategy. 
The greatest short-run profits would be 
achieved by using price as a rationing 
instrument - admi$ii only those who could 
pay the most. However, long term profits are 
harmed if the reputation suffers due to 
unqualified (but wealthy) students being 
admitted. In other words, maximizing long 
term profits requires a difFerent strategy than 
maximizing short term profits. Assuming 
need-blind admissions, the following analysis 
' ought to be accurate. 
Suppose 3 students are admitted, each at 
distinct spots on the demand curve -- some 
FIGURE 2: Price Discrimination 
In a Mompoly 
p, 
Q, 
Quantity 
above and some below the typical price, PE 
(see FIGURE 2). If this price were universally 
charged, many students would be unable to 
attend and the revenue that they offer would 
be forgone. Here a monopoly's ability to price 
d i i t e  becomes pertinent. 
The hitution, n d g  at least the shaded 
area to break even, utilizes financial aid forms 
in an attempt to ascertain each student's 
maximum abity to pay. Ideally, each 
enrollment fee will be the one shown on the 
diagram. 
Government assistance complicates this 
situation; I am unsure exactly who gives and 
receives the payments, so I am unable to 
analyze them. Essentially, though, perfect 
information and first degree price 
discrimination are the institution's goals, as 
these would allow all of the potential 
consumer surplus to become revenue. 
An important point is that the institution 
Jaws money on student 3, who can only afford 
P3. As mentioned in the introduction, profit 
maximization is not the only goal of an 
institution; need-blind admissions permit a 
deserving but costly student to receive his 
education. 
Another pricing technique of a monopoly, 
bundling, occurs as well, since students must 
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often purchase housing, meal plans, and books 
from the institution. The monopoly power and 
stringency of pricing techniques of an 
institution should increase over time, as the 
transferring process highlighted earlier 
becomes more impractical. However, I have 
not noticed significant payment changes as a 
second-year student, and I believe bundling 
actually decreases, as living off campus is 
permitted in later semesters. 
V. CONCLUSION 
When an institution is being chosen by a 
potential student, either the monopolistic 
competition or oligopoly model applies. 
Perhaps the latter is more applicable; as is so 
often the case, economic theory is difficult to 
apply to real-world phenomena. However, 
regardless of which market structure applies, 
significant product differentiation and large 
advertising costs result. In this case, the oft- 
made conclusion that inefficiently excessive 
advertising exists does not apply. First, much 
of the advertising is informational and assists 
students in making probably the most 
important decision of their lives up to that 
point. Second, as mentioned before, an 
institution's advertising often accomplishes 
other goals; only a portion of a dollar spent is 
"lost" to advertising. 
Scrutiny of other institutions and collusion 
are accurately predicted if the oligopoly model 
is accepted. Finally, once a student enrolls, a 
monopoly structure applies, and price 
discrimination and profit-maximizing 
techniques are employed. As a monopoly, 
long-run profits are possible, especially with 
the aid of the aforementioned pricing policies. 
By employing various market structures 
describing higher education, a fair amount of 
institutions' actions are predictable. 
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